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source: Kosova's Scientist's Institute
The Status Issue, Political Challenges and the Path to
European Integration
The report was drafted by M. Kullashi and B. Pula, with
contributions from other board members of Forum 2015: Sh.
Maliqi, M. Mustafa and Dukagjin Pupovci.
INTRODUCTION
This report has been prepared in the current atmosphere
of renewed diplomatic and political momentum focused on
the question of Kosova’s status, amid growing prospects
that Kosova may in the near future join the EU family of
states alongside its regional neighbours. It outlines
some key political challenges that the political process
will have to address, and provides arguments why the
solution, which is important not just for Kosova itself
but for the whole region - must be the recognition of
Kosova as an independent state. Independence is
essential for Kosova’s economic and social development,
and also in order to create proper foundations for the
process of stability and integration that will
eventually lead the Balkan states into the European
Union.
Accordingly, the report provides arguments from many
perspectives as to why independence is the most
rightful, pragmatic and sustainable solution - for
Kosova and Serbia alike. It also addresses various
concerns and counter-arguments regarding the future of
an independent Kosova, and in this context explains why
suggested alternatives to independence would not work.
The authors are convinced that uncertainty surrounding
Kosova’s future status, if prolonged in any form, would
merely serve to perpetuate elements of the current
status quo that have already produced, and would
continue to produce, all-round negative effects. If the
core problems are not addressed, the massive investments
the international community has made in Kosova and the
region could be put at risk.
The issue of Kosova’s status is rightly seen by Western
diplomats and policy-makers as one of the most
complicated problems in the Balkans, but also one that
it is crucial to solve if sustainable peace and
stability in the region are to be ensured. Nevertheless,
after the deployment of NATO troops in Kosova and the
withdrawal of Serbian forces in 1999, the international
community hesitated to address the status issue openly.
Their vacillation and lack of resolve (especially in the
case of certain EU countries) contrast sharply with the
plebiscitary demand for independence of Kosova’s
Albanians and non-Serb minorities, representing over 90%
of the population. This legitimate demand enjoys support
from many Western political centres, inluential
international organizations and independent political
analysts and scholars. In addition, a number of
prominent Serbian politicians too have voiced their
support for a more realistic position on the part of the
Belgrade government, given Serbia’s evident inability to
re-assert its control over Kosova(1).
The assessment of this report is that now is the
decisive moment to resolve the question of Kosova’s
status, in order to do away with an insecurity and
ambiguity that can only produce negative effects upon
Kosovaitself, upon Serbia and upon the entire region.
The authors are well aware that recognizing Kosovaas an
independent state is no simple matter for the
international community; but they also believe that no
other solution is viable. They further argue that
Kosova’s independence would not create any destabilizing
precedent in the practice of post-Cold War international
relations
This report is organized in ive main sections, preceded
by this introduction and followed by our conclusions and
recommendations.
Section 2 addresses Kosova’s economic and social
problems, linked to its political isolation by the
international community over the past six years. It
argues that a positive settlement of the status issue
would establish the necessary basic conditions for a
much more investor-friendly environment; it would also
end the social and cultural isolation of Kosovakeenly
felt by its young population, which must be offered
choices other than unemployment, emigration or political
extremism.
Section 3 tackles Kosova’s constitutional position in
the former Yugoslav federation, and during the events
leading to the latter’s dissolution. The fact that
within former Yugoslavia Kosovawas a fully
self-governing entity, effectively on a par with
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia or Slovenia,
provides a strong argument in favour of its
independence.
Section 4 provides a brief survey of recent and more
distant history, moving back from the reasons for
Serbia’s latest aggression against Kosova and NATO’s
intervention to the bitter experience of the Albanian
population under Belgrade’s direct rule, beginning with
the violent annexation of Kosovain 1912.
Section 5 considers key reservations expressed about
Kosova’s independence, and some problematic suggested
alternatives to full independence. The report contends
that any solution that does not place sovereignty over
Kosovairmly in the hands of the government in Prishtina
will lead to domestic and regional instability and
derail the process of internal democratization. To leave
the issue of who exercises sovereignty in
Kosovaambiguously deined, to restore sovereignty to
Belgrade, or to delegate it once again however
temporarily to some international administrative
structure - all of these would merely serve to impede
the formation of a politically strong citizenry and an
active civil society: ones capable of exercising, not
just symbolically but also materially, ownership of and
responsibility for their own government.
Section 6 addresses the problem of the Serb minority,
which for many diplomatic circles represents the
Achilles heel of normal democratic proposals for
resolving Kosova’s status. We argue, on the contrary,
that precisely only an independent Kosovawith an active
civil society will be able to create proper political
conditions for the safety and full integration of its
minorities, and in particular the Serb one.
In its closing paragraphs (Section 7), we offer a number
of summary conclusions, with key recommendations on the
future steps that stem from these.
2. Status Resolution as a Way Out of Kosova’s Economic
Crisis and its Political and Cultural Isolation
Contemporary Kosova’s acute problems are a direct
manifestation of the uncertainty of its current status.
In Caddition to the prevailing grave economic crisis,
there is also its cultural and political isolation from
Europe and the international community, likewise due to
the status impasse. This section argues why the
settlement of Kosova’s status through independence will
create the necessary conditions for resolving its
serious economic and social problems.
Status and the economic situation
Following a rapid revival in 1999-2002, when major
investments were made to repair the material and human
casualties of war, the economy of Kosovais now in
serious crisis. According to latest estimates by the
International Monetary Fund (IMF), Kosova’s GDP growth
this year (2005) will be negative (-0.5%), the only such
case in Europe. The unemployment rate in Kosovais
40-45%, the highest in Europe. Most of the unemployed
are young people, since 63% of Kosova’s population is
under 30. Unemployment and poverty have no ethnic
boundaries, and they threaten the most vulnerable groups
of society, families victimized by war, the rural
population, the elderly, women and the minorities. This
implies a need to launch drastic measures to place
Kosova’s economy on a track of development and growth.
Rapid economic development is the only route to
addressing social problems and imbalances in the
economic coniguration (GDP; consumption; exports and
imports; supply and demand in the labour market;
budgetary capacities; needs for public capital
investment, etc).
Uncertainty over the political future of Kosova and
weaknesses in the dual governing structure - UNMIK’s
international administration and the Provisional
Institutions of Self-Government - have impeded the
creation of more attractive conditions for local and
foreign investors. Some 25-30,000 new jobs need to be
created every year, i.e. three times the current
estimates, in order to address successfully the problem
of unemployment. This requires investment, and full
access to and cooperation with international inancial
institutions - in other words, Kosova’s full integration
into the global economy.
The two key routes for Kosova’s economic development
remain effectively blocked as a result of its unresolved
status. The irst route is the privatization of former
socially owned enterprises (SOEs), while the second is
access to loans and assistance from international
inancial institutions.
The privatization process in Kosovabegan after a
three-year delay caused by legal problems surrounding
the question of ownership - problems that lowed directly
from the uncertainty about who wielded sovereignty over
the territory as a whole. The process of privatization
started with establishment of the KosovaTrust Agency (KTA)
in June 2002, under the auspices of the EU Pillar. The
task of the KTA was to sell the assets of around 500
SOEs, so that these might contribute to economic
development and create new jobs. However, the process
was blocked repeatedly as a result of legal ownership
disputes. It did resume in the irst half of this year,
but the lengthy impasse has left an uncertain feeling
among investors, since a permanent threat of ownership
disputes lurks in the background. UNMIK is incapable of
resolving this matter, because it is only a provisional
administrator of property. The resolution of Kosova’s
status through independence could mean recognizing the
right of the KosovaAssembly to adopt laws on property
privatization, thus placing property disputes under the
jurisdiction of Kosova’s own judicial system. This would
be in conformity with the pre-Miloševic situation, when
Kosova’s Assembly - not Serbia - was the sole legal
owner of social property in Kosova, as a result of which
property disputes were handled exclusively by the
Kosovaor judiciary.
The other route for economic development namely capital
investments in infrastructure and the creation of
favorable conditions for business loans has likewise
been blocked as a result of the status limbo. For in the
eyes of the international community Kosovais not a
sovereign entity, so it does not have access to loans
from the World Bank (WB) or IMF.
This state of affairs has created a vicious cycle.
Economic development is one of the standards laid down
by the international community before the status process
can be initiated, yet its implementation is impossible
since Kosovalacks the necessary means. Despite numerous
improvisations over the past six years, it is clear that
only the resolution of status will make it possible to
tackle Kosova’s basic economic problems and pave the way
for its development and full integration into the
European and global economy.
In direct correlation with its political status,
sceptics and opponents of independence often claim that
an independent Kosovawould not be economically viable.
This issue can be viewed, however, from a different
perspective: who but Kosovaors can ensure their
country’s economic survival? It is clear that resolution
of the status issue in favour of independence should
ensure greater economic self-reliance and better
management of economic resources. At the same time, with
regard to human resources, Kosova- thanks to its young
and vital population - could have an advantage over
other countries of the region in an open market economy
and within regional and EU integration processes.
Kosovaproved its capacity for ensuring economic
independence even under Miloševic ‘s rule, when its
underground institutional infrastructure underpinned
both an active peaceful as well as an armed resistance
during the 1990s. After the war and despite its effects,
the institutional structures have since 2003 proved
capable of sustaining the KosovaConsolidated Budget.
The isolation of Kosova
The international community has provided considerable
assistance for the reconstruction of Kosova and the
establishment of new institutions. Investments in
Kosovaby the European Union alone over the past six
years have totalled some 2.3 billion. The decision of
the international community to delay the resolution of
Kosova’s status has nevertheless had serious
consequences for development in several areas. It is
something of a paradox that the period of international
presence since 1999 has also been the period of Kosova’s
greatest relative isolation from the rest of the world.
Thus, for example, representatives of the local
institutions, government, ministries, national assembly
and presidential ofice have been unable to join their
SCG counterparts on visits to international meetings and
summits, in order to contribute to diplomatic and other
discussions regarding developments in Kosova. While
during most of the 1990s Kosova’s political
representatives were regularly received by Western
governments, today, when Kosova’s institutions have been
established under the auspices of the United Nations,
Kosova’s representatives have a much harder time gaining
access to diplomatic and political oficials throughout
the world. It is indeed strange that Kosovahas no
liaison ofices in foreign countries, and its government
no portfolio for foreign affairs. In fact Kosovais not
represented in any regional, European or global
organization: neither in the UN, nor in the Stability
Pact, the OSCE or the Council of Europe.
Moreover, this isolation is apparent in all areas of
life. In the economic sphere, requests by Kosovaor
leaders for investment have met with a single response
from the international representatives, namely that this
is impossible due to the unresolved status’. In the ield
of education, Kosovahas not been admitted into the
Bologna Process, despite having a clear policy of higher
education reforms, and despite the fact that all
European countries (with the exception of Belarus) and
many Caucasian states are already part of this process.
Experience in the areas of scientiic research, culture
and sports are similar. With the exception of a few
sporadic and largely symbolic actions, Kosovar society
has been deprived of communication with foreign bodies
for the same alleged reason. On the rare occasions when
a delegation from Kosovais invited to attend
international meetings, Serbian representatives react by
opposing any public presentation by it.
Isolation is both institutional and physical. Kosova’s
inhabitants can travel only with documents issued by
UNMIK, which they acquire after many dificulties and
which expire quickly. Moreover, many countries do not
recognize such documents. Kosovars need visas for all
countries apart from Albania and Macedonia, a rather
dificult requirement given the absence of foreign
embassies in Prishtina. Kosovaors living abroad, of whom
there are considerable numbers due to emigration in the
1970s, 80s and 90s, are not entitled to use the UNMIK
documents to establish permanent residence in foreign
countries, but instead are forced to obtain passports of
the Union of Serbia and Montenegro. This submits them to
maltreatment, neglect and blackmail, or in some cases
even the denial of consular services. In other words,
this population experiences directly Kosova’s lack of
political status.
To make matters worse, Kosova’s post-1999 segregation
from the world - following a decade of isolation imposed
by Serbia through systematic terror - has had grave
consequences both for its development and for its
communication with international organizations,
something that would have helped solve its
long-accumulated problems. We are certain that improved
communications with international organizations, and
Kosova’s integration into the world community, will help
place Kosovaon a safe track towards the implementation
of European standards of economic growth,
democratization and political stability. At the same
time, such communication will help to overcome negative
phenomena among the new political parties and
institutions of Kosova: corruption, incompetence,
inertia and irresponsibility.
This is an urgent necessity for Kosova, one that does
not permit the luxury of further postponement. There are
currently over 350,000 students in Kosova, who in a few
years will join the labour market. If this population
cannot ind jobs and a future in Kosova, it will soon ind
its way to the doorsteps of West European countries.
3. Kosova’s Constitutional Position in the Former
Yugoslav Federation
The international community’s protracted maintenance of
Kosova’s current ill-deined and uncertain status is all
the Tmore strange in view of its self-governing status
within the former Yugoslavia. The status issue is
habitually treated by international diplomatic and
political circles outside the historical context of the
construction and dissolution of the former Yugoslav
federation, with all its weighty consequences for
Kosova’s sovereignty. Keeping to essentials, this
section briely highlights a number of salient historical
facts indicating that the problem of Kosova’s status was
essentially invented by Miloševic.
The inevitable starting point is the juridical reality
that, by virtue of the constitution of the former
Yugoslavia, Kosova, while nominally not enjoying the
status of a fully-ledged republic, nonetheless possessed
practically all attributes and functions pertaining to
the republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (SFRY), subsequently recognized as the
latter’s legal successors.
Thus according to both the federal constitution and its
own, Kosovafunctioned within the Yugoslav federation as
an independent and self-governing unit. The political
administration of Kosovaconsisted of structures wielding
autonomous legislative, executive, and judicial powers.
The Assembly was the highest legislative body within the
territory of Kosova, and the Constitutional Court of
Kosovathe highest judicial authority. Like the other
federal units - the six republics and the province of
Vojvodina - Kosovahad its own independent judiciary,
while executive power rested in the hands of its own
government, which controlled its police and territorial
defence forces.
In 1989 the regime of Slobodan Miloševic , as part of
its efforts to destroy the existing Yugoslav
constitutional order, abolished the autonomous status of
Kosova- in contravention of the existing Yugoslav
constitution - by resorting to a combination of
political pressure and use of force in order to absorb
Kosovainto Serbia’s legal and political system. At the
time of Yugoslavia’s collapse, and in line with similar
actions in other federal units, its Assembly declared
Kosovaa sovereign entity on 2 July 1990. In September
1990 the Assembly adopted the Constitution of the
Republic of Kosova. In the same month the population
reafirmed its will to independence by way of a
referendum.
The fact that Kosovafunctioned as an independent entity
for nearly ive decades, half of that time with full self
government, challenges the allegation that the Republic
of Kosovahad never been a state entity or that it arose
out of nothing. Given its former status as one of
Yugoslavia’s eight self-governing territories, Kosovais
neither politically nor legally comparable to such
secessionist creations as Republika Srpska in
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
The problem of Kosovatoday arose exclusively as a
consequence of the political and military aggression
waged against it by the Miloševic regime in the late
1980s and early 90s, as part of the latter’s general
onslaught against the Yugoslav federation. The refusal
of Kosova’s population to accept their country’s violent
integration into Serbia was a legal and legitimate act,
by contrast with Miloševic ‘s aggression which - as is
widely recognized - formed merely the initial step in
his regime’s destruction of the political equilibrium
established in the region by the creation of the
Yugoslav federation at the end of World War II, and
within that federation of the self-governing entity of
Kosova.
In view of these historical, political and
constitutional precedents, it is easy to understand the
frustration felt by the Kosovaor population when faced
with the current legal and political reservations
against their country’s independence. One of the
frequently mentioned caveats - no border changes -
contrary to all legal evidence assumes Kosovato have
been an inseparable part of the former Yugoslav republic
of Serbia. Certain circles even talk about a possible
domino effect, claiming that recognition of Kosova’s
independence would lead to further divisions in the
Balkans. Such arguments are frequently voiced also by
Serbian parties and governmental circles. But they
completely ignore the political context of the wars of
the Yugoslav succession, which inevitably came to
involve also Kosova and which motivated Kosova’s demand
for independence.
Faced with the dissolution of the Yugoslav federation,
the international community in 1992 recognized Slovenia,
Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia but not Kosova,
accepting - more by default than through any
consideration of the legalities - the fact that at the
time of Yugoslavia’s disintegration in 1991 Serbia had
already annexed Kosova. Yet the criteria governing
recognition for the constituent units of the former
Yugoslavia relied on the Yugoslav constitution on the
one hand, on referendums in which the majority of the
populations concerned had declared for independence on
the other. It is obvious that the same arguments hold
true also for Kosova(2).
The issue of Kosovawas set aside at the time when the
other successor states were recognized, despite the fact
that as a federal unit it met all the same criteria as
they did: it had its own constitution, government,
assembly, bounded territory, all deined and guaranteed
by the Yugoslav federal constitution3. The legal and
constitutional differences between the status of Kosova
and that of the six republics were minor and non-
essential, whereas their similarities in terms of
competency were crucial. For example, at the
all-Yugoslav level Kosovaexercised a right of veto in
legal, political and economic decision-making equal to
that of other federal units. Moreover, it is well known
that the right to adopt and repeal laws deines the
sovereignty of a state. Lastly, in the referendum of
1991 - analogous to those held in other federal units -
the majority of Kosova’s population voted for
independence.
It is important to recall in this way the legal,
constitutional and political status of Kosova and its
people within the former Yugoslav federation, because to
do so places the conlict between Serbia and Kosovaover
the latter’s status into its proper political context,
and refutes any over-simplifying approach that seeks to
explain the conlict as an ethnic one between the
Albanian and Serb communities. The political conlict
over Kosova, while indeed often manifested through
internal ethnic divisions, is in fact essentially a
by-product of Belgrade’s policies rather than being
rooted in any long-standing intolerance between two
rival ethnic communities. Albanians and Serbs in
Kosovahave a long history of co-existence, whereas
violent confrontations have been episodic and brief.
Policies enacted by the Serbian state - and not
endogenous factors, or ‘ancient hatreds’ between
Albanians and Serbs - have been the main motor of the
conlict in Kosova.
4. Kosovaas a Colonial Problem: Albanians under Belgrade
Rule
Serbia’s treatment of Albanians as an oppressed and
unwanted people did not begin with the war of 1999, or
Swith Miloševic ‘s rise to power in 1989. Ever since
Serbia’s invasion and annexation of Kosovain 1912-13 -
i.e. of a territory where, according even to Serbian
estimates, around 60% of the population was non-Serb -
Kosovaor Albanians have suffered constant repression and
persecution, and have continuously been viewed by Serb
nationalists as a threat to the interests of the Serbian
state. At the same time, Serbia’s expansion into
non-Serb territories and the systematic maltreatment of
its non-Serb population has had a deleterious effect on
its will and capacity to create a democratic polity. The
anti-Albanian policy continued after the formation of
the Yugoslav kingdom in 1918. Albanians were deprived of
the right to education in their mother tongue; their
rights as a minority population (rights enjoyed by other
minorities such as the Hungarians and Germans in the
north) were not recognized; and they were excluded from
citizenship. Until 1929 indeed, Belgrade emphatically
denied the existence of any Albanian minority in the
kingdom, while simultaneously instituting a policy aimed
at changing the ethnic structure of the Kosovaor
population. In the period between the two world wars,
Serbia confiscated over 200,000 hectares of land from
the local population - nearly half of all arable land -
and distributed it to Serb settlers. The number of
settlers soon rose to around 60,000, or over 15% of the
overall population. There were also plans, only partly
realized, to deport most of the Albanian population of
Kosovato Turkey. After the end of World War II and the
constitution of Federal Yugoslavia, Kosovabecame an
autonomous province within the newly constituted
Republic of Serbia. Anti-Albanian terror continued,
however, under the direction of the Serbian and Yugoslav
hard-line leader, interior minister Alexander Rankovic
(4). It was only after his removal and the
marginalization of dogmatists within the Yugoslav League
of Communists in the mid 1960s that it became possible
to create a new constitutional arrangement, as a result
of which Serbian rule was removed from Kosova. The
latter now became a self-governing federal unit, with
rights and responsibilities equal to that of
Yugoslavia’s six republics and the province of Vojvodina.
It remained a self-governing federal entity until 1989,
when an orchestrated campaign to revise the Yugoslav
constitution was launched by the Communist League of
Serbia headed by Slobodan Miloševic . Kosova’s autonomy
became the first casualty in Miloševic ‘s war against
Federal Yugoslavia(5). Following the violent abrogation
of Kosova’s autonomy in 1989, Miloševic ‘s regime
expelled Albanians en masse from state and public
employment (around 90% of Albanians working in the
administration and 70% of those working in public and
socially owned enterprises were dismissed); shut down
the University of Prishtina and nearly all high schools;
closed down or muzzled Albanian-language media; exerted
brutal repression against Albanian political activists;
and established a generalized system of apartheid in
Kosova, where the Serb minority now ruled with the
military, police, political and economic backing of
Belgrade. During the 1990s, Belgrade tried to return
Kosovato the condition in which it had been in the
1930s. This project was destined to fail, however,
because the Albanian population was no longer what it
had been at that time, having already enjoyed an
improved political position under the advanced autonomy
of the former Yugoslav federation and Kosova’s own
institutional and state structures. Thus the attempt to
bring Kosovaback to a regressive state triggered a mass
mobilization of its Albanian inhabitants, initially for
resistance and later to fight for the right of
self-determination, as with the other entities of the
former Yugoslavia(6). The Albanians’ bitter experience
under Belgrade’s rule during most of the twentieth
century, culminating in the mass killings and expulsions
of 1999, abolished any Serbian claim to legitimate rule
over Kosova. It is clear, moreover, that the attitude of
the Serbian leadership towards Kosovahas undergone no
fundamental change despite the removal of Miloševic from
power.
Faced with systematic Serbian state terror, the
KosovaAlbanians maintained a peaceful resistance for
several years. At the end of the 1990s, however, when
purely political resistance had proved ineffective, the
armed resistance of the KosovaLiberation Army was born.
This won the support of the majority of Kosovaors. We
view these two forms of resistance as complementary
rather than exclusive, since each under certain
circumstances and at a certain time contributed to
fulfilling the aspirations of the people of Kosova.
NATO’s military intervention in 1999 following the
unanimous decision of 22 countries and in support of
chapter VII of the UN Charter, and the resulting
withdrawal of Serbian forces, created conditions for a
just settlement of Kosova’s future in the form of
international recognition of its independence. This
decision should have been made by the Western powers
already in 1999, but for various reasons - including
pressure from Russia and lack of determination among
Western political and diplomatic circles - it was not.
The delay further complicated the situation in Kosova
and the Balkans. The international civilian and military
presence in Kosova- KFOR and UNMIK - created conditions
for security, reconstruction, and the establishment of
the first democratic institutions after the 2001
municipal elections and the subsequent parliamentary
ones. However, the fundamental question in Kosova- the
sovereignty over its territory - remained unresolved.
Without a definitive solution to this problem, it is
illusory to hope for long-lasting stability in Kosova
and the Balkans. As mentioned earlier in this report,
the crisis and dissolution of the former Yugoslavia was
set into motion by Serbia’s violent policy towards the
Albanians of Kosova. The Serbian leadership even now
continues to mobilize Serbs in both Kosova and Serbia on
a nationalist platform. In the last couple of years,
rather than focusing on Serbia’s democratization and its
serious economic and social problems, Serbian political
parties and opinion makers have preferred to keep the
Kosovaissue on the boil. Recent opinion polls and
monitoring of the Serbian media show a high level of
hatred against Albanians, much higher than against other
nations with whom Serbia fought even bloodier wars, such
as Croats or Bosnians. At a conference held in Prishtina
in June 2005, two of the most prominent Serbian
intellectuals and political activists, Žarko Korac and
Latinka Perovic , denounced such attitudes as shameful
and racist (7).
Official Serbia has never admitted the atrocities
perpetrated by their forces against the Albanian
population of Kosovaduring the war of 1999. This
aggression, which principally targeted the civilian
population, resulted in the killing of nearly 10,000
people; the expulsion of almost half the local Albanian
population; the disappearance of thousands; the rape of
countless women; the destruction of nearly 150,000
homes; as well as other traumata and sufferings
impossible to quantify. It is illusory, if not downright
immoral, to believe that after such an experience a
population could be forced to live in a union with the
state that carried out such aggression, and that has yet
to express remorse and accept full responsibility (8).
The complete and unconditional separation of Kosova and
Serbia would represent both a guarantee to Albanians
that they will not face renewed repression, and an
opportunity for Serbia seriously to address its past and
redefine its political identity. Freeing Serbia from
Kosovawould represent an opportunity for it to break
once and for all with aggressive nationalism and archaic
colonial thinking, and to commit itself to its own
democratization. Such a development would provide the
basis for a healthy and peaceful cooperation and
co-existence between Serbia and Kosovain the Balkans.
5. Why Reservations About Independence are Misplaced
Peace and stability in the Balkans are in the interest
of all - the citizens of Balkan countries as well as the
entire international Pcommunity.Some of the reservations
expressed about Kosova’s independence rely on claims
that recognizing it would trigger off regional
instability, including new armed conlicts. Fear of
regional destabilization has consequently led various
international policy-making circles to seek alternative
solutions for Kosova’s status, such as broad autonomy
within the Union of Serbia and Montenegro’ or
independence without sovereignty’.
In this section we rebut claims that recognition of an
independent Kosovawould risk regional instability. We
argue that, on the contrary, a clear stance on the
sovereignty and international legal character of
Kosovaare essential precisely for stability in the
region.
Complications arising from delay
The international community’s delay in resolving the
status of Kosovahas only complicated the political
situation there and throughout the region. Negative
consequences of delaying a solution include the
following:There is widespread uncertainty and fear among
KosovaAlbanians regarding their future, especially since
until recently a return of Serbian rule was not firmly
and explicitly ruled out by the international community.
Similar uncertainty and fear affect also KosovaSerbs,
and are relected among their political leaders, who in
the hope of a re-establishment of Serbian rule over
Kosovahave hung back from joining the new
Kosovainstitutions. Observing the lack of a clear
position by the international community on Kosova’s
status, Serbian political parties and opinion-makers
began manipulating the Kosovaissue for their own
internal and external purposes. This has created room
for political processes that might once again endanger
the fragile stability of the region. It has been harder
to achieve agreed political solutions guaranteeing
special constitutional and legal rights for the Serb
minority. Thus, for example the political context
created by Kosova’s unresolved status has overly
politicized the issue of decentralization, raising fears
among the public that this might lead to a new -
ethnically based - territorial division of Kosova, as a
irst step towards its partition and even eventually
towards annexation by Serbia of Serb-inhabited
territories in the north and east.
Delays in resolving Kosova’s status have thus created
grave obstacles to Kosova’s institutional and economic
reconstruction. It was only after the violent events of
17-18 March 2004, in fact, that the international
community’s representatives made their irst public
proposals for addressing the status issue. The violence,
which took on an ethnic character and culminated in the
burning of Serb houses and churches, exposed the
weaknesses of both Kosovaor political and civil society
and the international organizations, particularly UNMIK
and KFOR. Frustration over the lack of a clear future,
especially among young Kosovaors, was clearly exploited
by Albanian extremists and channelled toward ethnically
motivated violence.
These tragic events provoked strong reactions both
within Kosovaor society and among international
political circles, highlighted by a sharply critical
report from the UN Secretary General’s special envoy Kai
Eide and by subsequent diplomatic developments. It is
ironic that these tragic events had to occur, in order
for the international community to focus its attention
on the need to address the status question without
further delay. The March riots at last made the
international community aware of how the status impasse
continually generates new dissatisfaction and
frustration, inciting tensions and threatening fresh
outbursts. Yet it has still not demonstrated the
necessary commitment to bring closure to the problem, by
completing the process begun with the dissolution of
Yugoslavia and recognizing Kosovaas a sovereign state.
Kosova’s independence and the status of Bosnia and
Macedonia
In objecting to Kosova’s independence, Serbian
politicians often employ the argument that this could
lead to the dissolution of Bosnia-Herzegovina, through
the secession of Republika Srpska and its uniication
with Serbia. The same argument is heard at times from
Western analysts and diplomats. But this argument is
unfounded for several reasons. First, as indicated
above, there is an essential difference between the
status of Kosova and that of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s
Republika Srpska. While Kosovawas a federal unit of the
former Yugoslavia, with similar constitutional
competencies to the republics, Republika Srpska was
created ab novo in the early 1990s, by means of ethnic
cleansing and mass crimes committed against the civilian
population, including genocide. The international
community accepted the Serb entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina
for purely pragmatic reasons, whereas Kosova’s right to
international recognition rests on its legally and
constitutionally validated status within the former
Yugoslav federation.
There is similar confusion over the potential
repercussions of Kosova’s independence for Macedonia.
Serbian politicians and certain Western diplomats claim
that recognizing Kosova’s independence would lead to a
division of Macedonia, and to the uniication of its
mainly Albanian-inhabited western part with Kosova. Such
an assumption, however, is not in accordance with
political realities in Macedonia. While that country’s
Albanian political parties - and its Albanian population
generally - do support the demand of Kosovaors for
independence, they have also made it clear that they
want to achieve their own rights within the Republic of
Macedonia. Independent studies of the region demonstrate
that Kosova’s independence would in fact have a positive
impact on the stability and integration of Macedonia,
not least because it would establish an internationally
recognized border between the two states. The majority
of Macedonian politicians too have come to recognize
that respecting the political will of the people of
Kosovawould have a positive impact on their country’s
stability. In June 2005 there was a successful meeting
between the current Kosovaor prime minister and his
Macedonian counterpart. The Macedonian government has
indeed clearly stated that any democratic solution for
Kosova’s status would be acceptable to it. Hence,
Kosova’s independence poses no threat to the integrity
and stability of Macedonia. On the contrary, we believe
that obstructing it could lead to possible revolts not
only among the Albanians of Kosovaitself, but also among
those of Macedonia - something that could incite wider
disintegrative processes in the region.
Problematic alternatives to full independence
The preliminary positions of the EU and US on Kosova’s
status exclude three options: return to the pre-1999
situation; partition; and uniication with other states
in the region. Exclusion of these three options has
removed certain threats hanging like dark clouds over
Kosova, but the crucial issues for any inal settlement
still remain to be resolved.
In their reports this year the International Crisis
Group (ICG) and the International Commission on the
Balkans (ICB), two of the most prestigious international
organizations, announced their support for Kosova’s
independence as the best and most realistic option. They
argued for an initial phase of conditional
independence’, in the sense of preserving for a certain
period the authority of the international community in
protecting human and minority rights. These reports, as
well as opinions expressed by the representatives of
various Western countries, emphasize the need for a
presence of international troops in Kosova(extension of
KFOR’s mandate, or deployment of another NATO formation,
or EU troops) for an open-ended period, even after the
resolution of status.
The vast majority of Kosova’s population will not object
to the presence of foreign troops as guarantors of
stability and security, provided that Kosovais granted
its merited status within international organizations
and institutions, beginning with membership of the
United Nations. It is only after Kosovahas acquired real
independence and become a proper state that it will be
in a position - as a consequence of the declared will of
its population - to share elements of its sovereignty,
in the sense of allowing international military and
civilian missions to provide security for all its
citizens and ethnic communities.
EU and US representatives insist that any settlement of
Kosova’s status must include negotiations between the
Serbian and Kosovaor governments. It is dificult to deny
the need for such talks, even more so bearing in mind
the numerous unresolved technical issues between Serbia
and Kosova. It is understandable too that the
international community should wish to proceed with the
agreement and consent of Serbia, so that a long-term
solution can be reached, and tensions and regional
instability avoided. However, this approach involves
some dificulties. So far, Serbia’s political leadership
has ruled out independence as an option, and recently it
has been proposing the ‘more than autonomy, less than
independence’ model as what it calls a compromise’. But
this formula does not offer conditions for a viable
solution, not least because it entails embracing a
strange and contradictory set-up unseen in international
practice, which would lead only to growing tensions and
conlict rather than a stable and long-term solution.
Kosova’s independence, on the other hand, is necessary
in order to implement its integration into EU and
Atlantic structures. The EU, the US and international
committees of experts all support Kosova’s request for
integration. But integration implies independence. The
fact is that the EU and Atlantic structures are made up
of members that are sovereign states, not territories
with an experimental status. Therefore, Kosovacannot be
integrated into these structures through the formula of
‘more than autonomy, less than independence’.
The truth is that Kosovahas had a conditional and dual
status for six years now: it is not an independent and
internationally recognized state, yet at the same time
it is independent from Serbia through an international
protectorate. There is no good reason for such dualism
and ambiguity to be perpetuated in another shape or
form. We strongly believe that whereas no danger will be
entailed by the international community’s recognition of
Kosovaas a sovereign state, an unsustainable compromise
imposed by the international community regarding its
status - one that avoided specifying the ultimate bearer
of sovereignty - would indeed contain great dangers for
the stability of the region. Such a solution would be
defective irst and foremost in that, by conserving
uncertainty surrounding Kosova’s international legal
character, it would bar it from participation in
international institutions, with all the serious
consequences for its population that were detailed in
Section 2 above.
The international community is perfectly aware of the
fact that the Serbian leadership, though aware that it
cannot regain direct rule over Kosova, remains inhibited
by Serbia’s internal political climate from adopting a
more realistic stance regarding Kosova’s full separation
from Serbia. It is, therefore, more likely than not that
negotiations between representatives of Kosova and
Serbia will indeed take place, but with little chance of
reaching an agreement.
We believe that representatives of the international
community, having assumed political responsibility by
launching military intervention and establishing an
international protectorate in Kosova, should - along
with its people - be the ones to have the inal say on
its status. This would make it easier for the Serbian
leadership and public to accept Kosova’s independence,
and to interpret it as a realistic and inevitable
solution arising from federal Yugoslavia’s dissolution.
In addressing the status issue, the diplomatic community
cannot treat the Kosovaor and Serbian leaderships’
claims over Kosova’s future status as symmetrical and of
equal legitimacy, for the following reasons:
a) It is the democratically expressed will of its
population that Kosovashould join the international
community as an independent state. Polls on the issue
show that 93% of Albanians and 87% of non-Serb
minorities in Kosovasupport independence.
b) It was not Kosovathat initiated aggression against
Serbia, but the other way around. It was Serbia not
Kosovathat forced the international community to launch
military intervention. (Before attacking Kosova, indeed,
Serbia had precipitated three earlier wars of aggression
in the region: against Slovenia, Croatia and
Bosnia-Herzegovina.)
There is a real risk that talks between Kosovaor and
Serbian representatives on the issue of status could
drag on indeinitely. An interminable negotiating process
is likely to feed into the vacillations and calculations
of certain political circles in Europe, particularly
those which cannot free themselves from old ways of
viewing Balkan problems. Any such delay in reaching a
solution could provoke new political tensions both in
Kosova and in Serbia, impeding the implementation of
policies addressing the serious economic and social
problems of both countries. Any faltering or vacillation
in addressing the issue of Kosova’s status in an
expedient manner is bound in particular to cause social
and political instability within Kosovaitself.
Kosova’s independence and democratization of the Western
Balkans
Kosova’s independence is a logical and just conclusion
to the international intervention, and will be fully
justiied when the institutions, procedures and values of
a functioning and sustainable democratic system are
established not only in Kosova, but in Serbia and
throughout the region as well. Some people may believe
that the project of democratization can be achieved by
forcing Kosovainto a union with Serbia, or into the
Union of Serbia and Montenegro, but this would never
work for the reasons speciied above. It is far more
eficient and pragmatic to approach the democratic
development of these three entities separately, rather
than to invest effort in a complicated and ultimately
unworkable federal or confederal union of Serbia,
Montenegro and Kosova.
We think, moreover, that it would be much easier to
establish and guarantee national and political rights
for the Serb minority in Kosova, which numbers around
200,000 (including those yet to return), than to try to
convince over two million Kosovaor Albanians to join
Serbia, a country which they perceive as prejudiced,
foreign, and a threat to their freedom. The instruments
to guarantee national, political and economic rights for
the Serb minority will be much more easily implemented
in a democratic Kosovathan similar conditions for
Kosovaor Albanians would be in a hypothetical common
framework with Serbia and Montenegro.
This is due not only to the fact that the union of the
latter is unlikely to last, given Montenegro’s desire to
achieve its own independence from Serbia, but also
because Kosova- unlike Serbia and Montenegro - already
possesses instruments of direct control and democratic
development (UNMIK, OSCE, KFOR and international police
forces). Installing such international missions in
Serbia would be tantamount to a second intervention, and
would constitute an even more serious violation of
Serbia’s sovereignty.
6 Ensuring Minority Rights and Kosova’s Status
The international community has included guarantees for
the security of the Serb minority among the basic
conditions Tfor addressing the status of Kosova. The
fact that this issue seems to have become an obstacle to
moving forward has aggravated relations between the
Albanian majority and the Serb minority. The Albanians
are frustrated by the fact that the Serb minority
appears as the main obstacle to independence. The Serbs,
meanwhile, fearful of taking any action that might
appear to legitimize Kosova’s separation from Serbia,
refuse to join political processes designed to agree
their own legal and security position within the
political and judicial institutions of Kosova, in
particular through a widespread boycott of parliamentary
elections.
Political tensions between the majority and the minority
can and should be viewed in a different perspective,
however, in relation not just to the issue of
sovereignty, but also to the entire corpus of human
rights and freedoms that should be guaranteed and
implemented in Kosova(within the framework of European
standards, and other conventions for the protection of
human and minority rights and freedoms).
The majority in Kosovamust certainly carry the biggest
share of responsibility for ensuring a normal life and
guaranteeing rights for minorities. The Albanian
majority’s readiness to accept this responsibility in
regard to the rights of most minorities is relected in
its relatively good relations with non-Serb minorities,
which play an active role in Kosova’s political
institutions. Ethnic tensions present between it and the
Serb population derive mainly from the still raw memory
of rule by the Serb minority in the 1990’s and during
the conlict, when most Kosovaor Serbs openly supported -
or were involved as militants of - the Miloševic regime.
Being relatively small in numbers and territorially
dispersed, however, the Serb minority objectively lacks
the potential to obstruct the resolution of Kosova’s
status in the longer term. As soon as Kosovaor Serbs are
freed from Belgrade’s tutelage and inluence, they will
no longer be considered a threat to Kosova’s territorial
integration or political stability, even if they are
guaranteed broader political and national rights within
a more advanced decentralized system. For their part,
however, the Serbs should see their interest in
advancing a free and democratic Kosovaby becoming its
loyal citizens. By viewing such a Kosovaas the locus of
their own democratic rights, Serbs would enable
themselves to join its government and society in
creating space and infrastructure for a mass return of
those who led during and after the war.
But the key condition for any such turning-point to be
reached in relations between Albanians and Serbs in
Kosovais for Serbia to cease fostering the illusion that
Kosovamay once again be run from Belgrade. The
international community should indeed make it clear to
the Serb minority that any return of Serbian rule to
Kosovais a false hope, and that consequently they should
seek their individual and collective future within the
political and social institutions of Kosovaitself.
With respect to the implementation of returns and
minority rights, one highly sensitive obstacle is
Belgrade’s manipulation of the real numbers of
KosovaSerbs, whether currently residing in Kosovaor
living as displaced persons elsewhere. Serbian oficial
sources claim that over 200,000 Serbs led Kosovaafter
the NATO intervention, while approximately 150,000 Serbs
are currently living in Kosova, thus arriving at a total
Kosovaor Serb population of over 350,000.These numbers
are highly exaggerated. Serbian estimates for the prewar
period spoke of 200-220,000 Serbs living in Kosova,
150,000 of whom were long-established residents, while
the rest had settled over the past two or three decades
as part of the economic migrations that were normal
across the former Yugoslav federation.
In order to avoid any possibility of manipulating
minority percentages, it would be best for a census to
be organized in Kosovaas soon as possible, according to
international standards and monitored by neutral
parties. A complete census both of the resident
population and of the displaced who consider themselves
citizens of Kosovawould permit the creation of an
invaluable database, which would not just register the
ethnic and other backgrounds of Kosova’s citizens, but
also provide a more realistic picture of their property
and rights.
So far as the return of displaced persons is concerned,
this is an immediate issue for those ready and willing
to reintegrate into Kosovaor society. In this
connection, the pledge by the Kosovagovernment and UNMIK
that the sustainable return of large numbers of Serbs,
Roma and other minorities will be pursued needs more
determined and transparent support from Kosovaor society
at large. However, no illusions should be harboured
about an immediate return en masse of all displaced
people. In the next six-month to one-year period, it
would be encouraging and realistic to have a number of
returns amounting perhaps to between ive and ten
thousand. This could change the general climate and
rebuild trust between minorities and majority, with a
view to achieving sustainable mutual cooperation and
understanding. This implies that the process of return
would not end with Kosova’s independence, but would
remain one of the key obligations of any independence
agreement, guaranteed and monitored by the international
community. One encouraging fact is that a growing number
of Kosovaor Albanians now support return of the
displaced (70% in June 2005, EWR nr. 10 UNDP/Riinvest)
(9).
The Kosovagovernment, political parties and civil
society organizations must as soon as possible prepare
awareness-raising programmes for the majority on the
need to advance minority rights and freedoms, especially
freedom of movement and communication, as well as
unimpeded use of property. We strongly believe that
after the settlement of Kosova’s status, the majority of
our citizens will support all measures designed to
ensure protection, security and freedom of speech and
movement for minorities, as guaranteed in every
democratic society.
Cultural and historical heritage - for instance,
Kosova’s monasteries and other mediaeval sites -
represents a key area where with even short-term
planning considerable progress can be made, achieving a
disproportionate symbolic effect. The Serb minority and
the Orthodox Church are very concerned about the status
and safety of the Peja Patriarchy, the monasteries in
Decan and Gracanica, and other historical and cultural
sites that are part of the world cultural heritage.
Kosovacitizens ought to be convinced that this is not
just the property of Serbs and the Orthodox Church, but
part of the heritage and cultural wealth of Kosova.
These are historical, cultural and tourist resources
that they should neither view with animosity, nor
consider as something alien or dangerous for the state
of Kosova. The Orthodox Church of Albania could help in
this domain, by conveying the experience of religious
tolerance in Albania among Muslims, Catholics and
Orthodox. Even in Kosova, where there is no Albanian
Orthodox community, there has historically been
inter-religious tolerance and cooperation, as shown by
the fact that under Ottoman rule Albanian Muslim
notables acted as guardians and protectors of Orthodox
monasteries.
A generous offer on the status of the two monasteries in
the Dukagjin valley - the Patriarchy and Decan - could
be included in the package of negotiations for creating
conditions of trust. This might involve the
establishment of some sort of special administration by
the Orthodox Church along with civil structures and
international guarantors, but involving also
representatives of the Kosovaauthorities and local
institutions.
Moreover, the Kosovagovernment and the majority
population should have no problem with the legalization
and free functioning of a public university in the
Serbian language in Kosova, either within the University
of Prishtina or independently from it. Albanians still
have fresh memories of their struggle to open, legalize
and expand Albanian-language universities in Prishtina
and Tetovo (Macedonia), so they should have nothing
against the right of the Serb minority - and other
communities (Gorani, Bosniaks and Roma) that speak Serb
or similar languages - to be educated in elementary
schools and a public or private university of their own.
A workable compromise is less likely, however, in regard
to demands linking the solution to the political status
of KosovaSerbs with territorial autonomy. The situation
in Kosovais not conducive to territorial autonomy on an
ethnic basis, due to the small number and dispersed
pattern of the Serb communities among a dozen enclaves.
The model of the Ohrid Agreement in Macedonia seems more
promising, in order to guarantee the status and rights
of KosovaSerbs. Instead of a territorial autonomy that
would threaten constant tension and even Kosova’s ethnic
partition, the model of the Ohrid Agreement would offer
the Serbs implementation of their rights within local
decentralized government. Through constitutional means
they could regulate the protection of their vital
political, cultural, religious and economic rights as a
minority. Moreover, an international agreement could
designate an international monitoring mission, to
evaluate in the coming years progress in the
implementation of this package of minority rights. The
mission would have the power to recommend sanctions and
other penalties for the Kosovagovernment in the event of
non-implementation. This would give the Serb minority
another guarantee that their future in Kosovais not at
risk.
Conclusions and Recommendations
The independence of Kosovais the only historically
justiied and politically viable solution that will
guarantee peace, stability and development in the
Balkans. Independence is a realistic solution for
Kosovabecause:
• Kosovawas an independent administrative and political
unit in the former Yugoslav federation. The conlict in
Kosovabegan as part of the disintegration of the
Yugoslav state. Therefore, Kosova’s independence
constitutes the inal chapter of the dissolution process
and the political reorganization of the Balkans.
• As a result of its special status in the Yugoslav
federation, the case of Kosovais not the same as that of
other conlict areas such as Republika Srpska (created by
ethnic cleansing), the Preševo valley or Macedonia
(where the issue at stake was how to advance the
political position of the Albanian minorities in Serbia
and Macedonia respectively). The resolution of Kosova’s
status should not be related to any of these disparate
issues, but should instead be based on its own speciic
history.
• Serbia has historically failed in governing Kosova.
Ever since its annexation of the latter in 1913, there
has been a tendency in Serbia to treat Kosovaas a
colonial territory. The key generator of conlict in
Kosovawas Serbia’s aggressive and repressive policy
against the local Albanian population, and not any
hatred or lack of trust between ethnic communities. With
its aggression and campaign of ethnic cleansing in 1999,
Serbia lost any legitimacy to rule over Kosovain any
shape or form.
• Independence is the only solution that will pave the
way to Kosova’s economic and social development,
especially bearing in mind the massive unemployment, the
young population and the constant pressure for
emigration. Placing sovereignty in Prishtina’s hands
will inally enable Kosova’s integration into regional,
European and global institutions, and allow its
emergence from the institutional, political and
diplomatic isolation imposed by the international
administration of UNMIK, as a result of the unresolved
status. Independence is the only path for Kosova’s
accession to the EU, since the latter continues to be a
union of independent states.
• Independence is the only viable long-term solution.
Any other solution - such as an autonomous territory
within the Union of Serbia and Montenegro, or
independence without sovereignty’ - remains unacceptable
to the Kosovaor population, so will not work. The
international community must refrain from treating
Kosovaas an area for institutional and diplomatic
experimentation, as it is doing with UNMIK. Independent
and sovereign states constitute the only historically
viable formula for the territorial and political
organization of Europe. Kosova’s independence will also
create opportunities for healthy and sustainable
relations between it and Serbia.
• Kosovastill needs support in institution building, and
in monitoring success in the implementation of minority
rights. For this very reason, we believe that a civil
international presence will be needed in Kosovaeven
after status settlement, albeit of a more limited and
speciic kind than is the case with UNMIK. This implies a
monitoring and supporting presence of the UN, EU, OSCE
and/or Council of Europe, but without decision-making
powers, which should properly reside with the
democratically elected assembly and government in
Prishtina. Kosovastill needs the military presence of
KFOR, for as long as this is required by the domestic
and regional security circumstances. We make the
following recommendations to Kosovaor leaders and
Western diplomats for the intermediate period, during
the process of addressing Kosova’s status:
• We recommend that a referendum be held in Kosova,
under UN supervision. We believe that consulting the
political will of the people of Kosovaon inal status is
both necessary and vital for a sustainable solution.
• We recommend that in the current provisional period
and during the negotiations, the EU should prepare
concrete investment projects to reduce unemployment and
stimulate economic production. The EU should move from
infrastructure assistance to direct support for the
export sector and for human capacity development,
primarily through investment in education.
• We recommend avoiding any further delay in the
decision-making process leading towards Kosova’s inal
status, in order to prevent an outburst of accumulated
popular dissatisfaction with the status quo and the
grave social and economic situation. The key risk is
that a protracted process of addressing the status issue
could exacerbate the current situation. Therefore, the
process of status resolution needs to be relatively
quick and must resolve the issue in a permanent manner.
Notes
(1). We have in mind particularly the Independent
International Group led by former Finnish prime minister
Marti Ahtisaari and former ICTY judge Richard Goldstone;
the International Crisis Group; the Committee for the
Western Balkans led by former Italian prime minister
Giuliano Amato; Noel Malcolm, Paul Garde, Morton
Abramowitz, Janusz Bugajski; the former foreign minister
of Serbia - Montenegro Goran Svilanovic ; former deputy
prime ministers of Serbia Cedo Jovanovic and Žarko Korac;
former speaker of the Serbian Parliament Nataša Micic ;
and former Serbian Communist leader Latinka Perovic .
(2). On this issue see Enver Hasani,Self-Determination
Under the Terms of the 2002 Union Agreement Between
Serbia and Montenegro: Tracing the Origins of Kosova’s
Self-Determination’, Chicago-Kent Law Review, Vol. 80
(2005), pp.305-29.
(3). This was particularly guaranteed by Article 5 of
the SFRY Constitution.
(4). For more details see Sabrina Ramet, Nationalism and
Federalism in Yugoslavia 1962 - 1991, Indiana University
Press, Bloomington 1992.
(5). It should not be forgotten that even during the
period of Kosova’s self-rule, Albanians continued to
provide the bulk of political prisoners in Yugoslavia.
According to estimates of the time, in the 1970s and
1980s the number of Albanians imprisoned for political
‘offences’ in Yugoslavia constituted 90% of the overall
number.
(6). On the resistance and mobilization of Albanians
during 1988- 92, see Besnik Pula, Emergence of the
KosovaParallel State, 1988 - 1992’, Nationalities
Papers, Vol. 32, No. 4 (December 2004), pp.797-826.
(7). ‘Žarko Korac spoke openly about prejudices in
Serbia against Albanians. I want to say openly that
these prejudices are at the limit of racism.’ Latinka
Perovic in her book Serbian-Albanian dialogue 2005: The
Future Status of Kosova, Helsinki Committee for Human
Rights in Serbia, Belgrade 2005, p.101.
(8). Despite its gestures of reconciliation toward
Croatia and Bosnia, the new regime in Serbia has not
made a single symbolic step to admit guilt and
responsibility for the aggressive war in Kosova, instead
trying to place the blame for the war on both sides.
While KosovaAlbanian leaders have made denunciatory
statements against the sporadic postwar violence against
Serbs in Kosova, the new regime in Belgrade has thus far
been unwilling to accept responsibility for Serbia’s
aggression against a civilian population.
(9). United Nations Development Programme, Human
Development Report - Kosova2004. http://www.Kosova.undp.org/HDR/hdr.htm.
Resolution of the Assembly of Kosova
source: Assambly of Kosova
* Pursuant to the Card of United Nations Organization on
the right of people for Self- Determination, as well as
based on other International Acts;
* Taking into consideration the legitimate aspiration of
Kosova Population to leave in Freedom and peace with
other people;
* Based to Historical, Juridical and Constitutional
developments of Kosova Expressed to the Conference of
Bunjajt (1943-44) , to the Constitutional Declaration of
July 2nd , 1990, based to the Referendum of 1991, as
well as to the Resolution of the Assembly of Kosova on
1991, for Kosova an Independent and Sovereign State;
* Based to the long war of Kosova People for Freedom and
Independence;
* Based to the general resistance against the occupation
and based as well to the armed war of Kosova Liberation
Army ;
* Confirming the guarantee for protection of rights for
all Communities in Kosova According to all International
Standards;
* Pursuant to the Programs of Political Parties on
Kosova Political Status ;
* Having high estimation for NATO Intervention in Kosova,
to prevent the genocide and ethnic cleansing exercised
by Serbia in Kosova , having as well high Estimation for
International assistance given to Kosova;
Assembly of Kosova issues the following:
RESOLUTION
ON RICONFIRMATION OF POLITICAL WILL OF Kosova PEOPLE FOR
Kosova AN INDIPENDENT AND SOVREIGN STATE
1. Assembly of Kosova reconfirms the will of Kosova
people for Kosova an Independent and Sovereign State;
2. Assembly of Kosova guarantee the reconfirmation on
political will of Kosova people for Independence,
through a referendum
3. Assembly of Kosova takes the obligation to issue the
Constitution in compliance with European Union
standards;
4. Assembly of Kosova requests for International support
of United Nation Organization, Unites States of America,
European Union as well as Other countries support for
Kosova an Independent and Sovereign State
5. Assembly of Kosova expresses the willingness to
ratify all recognized International Conventions and Acts
on Human and Communities rights, issued by United Nation
Organization, European Union, European Council and the
Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe
6. Assembly of Kosova is engaged for respecting and
guaranteeing of human rights and Freedom for Kosova
citizens and guaranteeing of Minority Community rights
in a fully Compliance with international standards;
7. Assembly of Kosova is engaged for integration of
Kosova into the Euro Atlantic Structures, welcoms their
further engagement on Kosova gives the commitment for
good relations with neighbor countries contributing to
the stability of region ;
8. Assembly of Kosova guarantee the territorial
integrity of Kosova and inviolability of Its borders
9. Assembly of Kosova confirms that will of Kosova
people for Independence is Nonnegotiable
10. Assembly of Kosova supporting the Delegation of
Kosova , will follow up the all working process and any
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