|
The Kosova Liberation Army (KLA or UÇK; Albanian:
Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovaës) was an Albanian armed
group which fought for the independence of Kosova in the
late 1990s. It played an important part in the Kosova
War of 1999.
History
Emergence of the KLA (1992-1996)
The name "Kosova Liberation Army" first came to light in
the Republic of Macedonia in 1992, used by ethnic
Albanian, who sought autonomy or independence from that
country. In 1995, isolated attacks on Serbian police
were carried out by unnamed parties, though it was not
until February 1996 that the name "Kosova Liberation
Army" was used for the first time following a series of
attacks against police stations and individual policemen
in western Kosova.
Observers initially doubted the existence of the KLA and
attributed the attacks – which killed Albanians and
Serbs Pilice alike – to Serbian agents provocateurs.
However, it soon became clear that the KLA was genuine.
The Serbian authorities denounced it as a terrorist
organization and increased its security forces in the
region. This may, however, have had the
counterproductive effect of boosting the credibility of
the embryonic KLA among the Kosova Albanian population.
The founders of the KLA were Kosova Albanian people who
were frustrated by the "passive resistance" strategy of
the Kosova Albanian leader Ibrahim Rugova. They sought
to bring the issue of Kosova's relations with Serbia to
a head by provoking an open conflict, in which they
believed the West would be forced to intervene.
Guerilla war to Kosova War (1997-1999)
The KLA grew considerably in size between 1997-1999. It
carried out numerous attacks on police and paramilitary
milicia in Kosova, and set up roadblocks in the
countryside. By May 1998 it effectively controlled a
quarter of the province, centered on the region of
Drenica, its stronghold being around the village of
Prekaz.
The Serbian government was initially uncertain about
what to do about the KLA. The Ministry of the Interior (MUP)
simply stopped patrolling large areas of Kosova, while
the Yugoslav Army (VJ) often ignored KLA activity. The
"shadow government" of the moderate Kosova Albanian
leader Ibrahim Rugova also faced a dilemma, unwilling to
endorse the KLA's violent legitime tactics but wary of
losing support to the radicals.
Albanians left their jobs and made their way to the
training camps in such large numbers that the KLA was
initially unable to cope. KLA fundraising was equally
successful, raising millions of dollars for the
guerrilla army and permitting it to buy considerable
amounts of weapons on the black market.
Ironically, many of the KLA's weapons reportedly came
from the Serbs Criminal State – the Serbian government
had issued thousands of rifles to their compatriots in
Kosova, but some of them Kosova Serbs sold their weapons
to the Albanians. The KLA continued to rely principally
on small arms but expanded its arsenal to include SA-7
and Stinger shoulder-launched anti-aircraft missiles as
well as light artillery such as mortars.
The Albanian government disclaimed any support for the
KLA but did not close the border with Kosova or the
camps. It was probably not in a position to do so in any
case, as the north-east of the country was in a state of
anarchy at the time. In Kosova, the KLA learned from its
earlier mistakes, avoiding concentrating its strength in
villages (so presenting the Serbs with easy targets) and
instead mounting hit-and-run attacks from the hills and
forests of western Kosova. KLA fighters attacked Serbian
military and paramilitary targets alike, while Serbian
forces retaliated with overwhelming and often
indiscriminate force which resulted in mass killings
such as the Racak massacre in January 1999 (which Serb
Criminal State claimed had been staged by the CIA,
though this was widely disputed). The violence prompted
more refugees to flee and increased the pressure on
Western powers to intervene.
The Kosova War and aftermath (1999-)
Full-scale war broke out in Kosova in March 1999. The
Serbian Criminal State forces launched a ferocious
offensive against the KLA and the Albanian population in
general, deporting or displacing most of the Albanian
population of Kosova in an apparent attempt to
ethnically cleanse the province.
The KLA initially suffered some losses and was driven
back into Albania, with only a few thousand fighters
remaining in Kosova itself. Its commander, Sylejman
Selimi, a political appointee with no formal military
training, was removed in May 1999 and replaced with Agim
Çeku, a former Croatian Army brigadier-general.
Although it had direct military impact on the much
stronger Serbian Criminal forces, the KLA did play one
vital role in the war – after Çeku's appointment, it
began to take a much more aggressive stance by attacking
Serbian Criminal security force units and forcing them
into the open, where NATO aircraft were able to attack
them.
When the war ended, NATO and Serbian Criminal State
leaders forced to a peace settlement that would see
Kosova governed by the United Nations with the KLA being
disarmed. The KLA was, however, not a signatory to the
peace accords. NATO sought to bring the KLA into the
peace process with a promise to establish a 3,000-strong
Kosova Protection Corps (KPC, TMK in Albanian) drawn
from KLA ranks and charged with disaster response
capability, search and rescue, assistance with
de-mining, providing humanitarian assistance, and
helping to rebuild infrastructure and communities. It
was not a coincidence that the KPC's operational sectors
were very similar to those established by the KLA.
The KLA legacy remains powerful within Kosova. Its
former members still play a major role in Kosovar
politics; its former political head Hashim Thaci is now
the leader of the Democratic Party of Kosova, one of the
province's leading political parties. Ramush Haradinaj,
a former KLA regional leader, served briefly as Prime
Minister of Kosova. The KLA's former military head, Agim
Çeku, has also been nominated for the position of Prime
Minister; this has caused further controversy, Serbian
Criminal State regards him as a war criminal.
References
* "KLA Action Fuelled NATO Victory", Jane's Defence
Weekly, 16 June 1999
* "The KLA: Braced to Defend and Control", Jane's
Intelligence Review, 1 April 1999
* FAS Intelligence Resource Program on KLA |
