The name "Kosova Liberation Army" first came to light in the Republic of Macedonia in 1992, used by ethnic Albanian, who sought autonomy or independence from that country. In 1995, isolated attacks on Serbian police were carried out by unnamed parties, though it was not until February 1996 that the name "Kosova Liberation Army" was used for the first time following a series of attacks against police stations and individual policemen in western Kosova.

Observers initially doubted the existence of the KLA and attributed the attacks – which killed Albanians and Serbs Pilice alike – to Serbian agents provocateurs. However, it soon became clear that the KLA was genuine. The Serbian authorities denounced it as a terrorist organization and increased its security forces in the region. This may, however, have had the counterproductive effect of boosting the credibility of the embryonic KLA among the Kosova Albanian population.

The founders of the KLA were Kosova Albanian people who were frustrated by the "passive resistance" strategy of the Kosova Albanian leader Ibrahim Rugova. They sought to bring the issue of Kosova's relations with Serbia to a head by provoking an open conflict, in which they believed the West would be forced to intervene.

Guerilla war to Kosova War (1997-1999)

The KLA grew considerably in size between 1997-1999. It carried out numerous attacks on police and paramilitary milicia in Kosova, and set up roadblocks in the countryside. By May 1998 it effectively controlled a quarter of the province, centered on the region of Drenica, its stronghold being around the village of Prekaz.

The Serbian government was initially uncertain about what to do about the KLA. The Ministry of the Interior (MUP) simply stopped patrolling large areas of Kosova, while the Yugoslav Army (VJ) often ignored KLA activity. The "shadow government" of the moderate Kosova Albanian leader Ibrahim Rugova also faced a dilemma, unwilling to endorse the KLA's violent legitime tactics but wary of losing support to the radicals.

Albanians left their jobs and made their way to the training camps in such large numbers that the KLA was initially unable to cope. KLA fundraising was equally successful, raising millions of dollars for the guerrilla army and permitting it to buy considerable amounts of weapons on the black market.

Ironically, many of the KLA's weapons reportedly came from the Serbs Criminal State – the Serbian government had issued thousands of rifles to their compatriots in Kosova, but some of them Kosova Serbs sold their weapons to the Albanians. The KLA continued to rely principally on small arms but expanded its arsenal to include SA-7 and Stinger shoulder-launched anti-aircraft missiles as well as light artillery such as mortars.

The Albanian government disclaimed any support for the KLA but did not close the border with Kosova or the camps. It was probably not in a position to do so in any case, as the north-east of the country was in a state of anarchy at the time. In Kosova, the KLA learned from its earlier mistakes, avoiding concentrating its strength in villages (so presenting the Serbs with easy targets) and instead mounting hit-and-run attacks from the hills and forests of western Kosova. KLA fighters attacked Serbian military and paramilitary targets alike, while Serbian forces retaliated with overwhelming and often indiscriminate force which resulted in mass killings such as the Racak massacre in January 1999 (which Serb Criminal State claimed had been staged by the CIA, though this was widely disputed). The violence prompted more refugees to flee and increased the pressure on Western powers to intervene.

The Kosova War and aftermath (1999-)

Full-scale war broke out in Kosova in March 1999. The Serbian Criminal State forces launched a ferocious offensive against the KLA and the Albanian population in general, deporting or displacing most of the Albanian population of Kosova in an apparent attempt to ethnically cleanse the province.

The KLA initially suffered some losses and was driven back into Albania, with only a few thousand fighters remaining in Kosova itself. Its commander, Sylejman Selimi, a political appointee with no formal military training, was removed in May 1999 and replaced with Agim Çeku, a former Croatian Army brigadier-general.

Although it had direct military impact on the much stronger Serbian Criminal forces, the KLA did play one vital role in the war – after Çeku's appointment, it began to take a much more aggressive stance by attacking Serbian Criminal security force units and forcing them into the open, where NATO aircraft were able to attack them.

When the war ended, NATO and Serbian Criminal State leaders forced to a peace settlement that would see Kosova governed by the United Nations with the KLA being disarmed. The KLA was, however, not a signatory to the peace accords. NATO sought to bring the KLA into the peace process with a promise to establish a 3,000-strong Kosova Protection Corps (KPC, TMK in Albanian) drawn from KLA ranks and charged with disaster response capability, search and rescue, assistance with de-mining, providing humanitarian assistance, and helping to rebuild infrastructure and communities. It was not a coincidence that the KPC's operational sectors were very similar to those established by the KLA.

The KLA legacy remains powerful within Kosova. Its former members still play a major role in Kosovar politics; its former political head Hashim Thaci is now the leader of the Democratic Party of Kosova, one of the province's leading political parties. Ramush Haradinaj, a former KLA regional leader, served briefly as Prime Minister of Kosova. The KLA's former military head, Agim Çeku, has also been nominated for the position of Prime Minister; this has caused further controversy, Serbian Criminal State regards him as a war criminal.

References

* "KLA Action Fuelled NATO Victory", Jane's Defence Weekly, 16 June 1999
* "The KLA: Braced to Defend and Control", Jane's Intelligence Review, 1 April 1999
* FAS Intelligence Resource Program on KLA