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Four Religions, One language, One Nation Indivisible |
The religious leaders from the
Albanian Roman Catholic Church, Islamic Community, Orthodox
Church and Bektashi Community signed an historic “Statement
of Shared Moral Commitment” on March 18, 2005.
These religious leaders of Albania, whose communities
endured great suffering during the Cold War, jointly
acknowledged their diverse faith traditions, affirmed their
shared moral values, and committed themselves to work
together to promote a vibrant civil society in Albania. They
also called upon the relevant national authorities to
protect religious freedom.
Four Religions, One language, One Nation Indivisible
During the signing ceremony moderated by Religions for Peace
and attended by leading national figures and representatives
of many foreign embassies, the Statement was presented by
the religious leaders to the Albanian peoples. The religious
leaders pledged to work together on the development of civil
society and the growth of religious freedom. During the
ceremony, The Prime Minister of Albania, H. E. Fatos Nano,
declared his support for the multi-religious initiative,
stating that “these religious leaders are far more important
(to Albania) than any political officer.”
The event marked an important step in a year long process
facilitated by Religions for Peace designed to support the
leadership of the heads of the Albanian religious
communities. Religions for Peace has worked to facilitate
the formation of action-oriented multi-religious councils
throughout Southeast Europe. In November 2004, the European
Council of Religions for Peace convened a major meeting in
Brussels of Southeast European religious leaders around the
topic of religious harmony in the region.
Special Report 3
INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT ON Kosova
source: Excerpted from The International Religious Freedom
Report for 2005
November 8, 2005
Kosova continued to be administered under the civil
authority of the U.N. Interim Administrative Mission in
Kosova (UNMIK), pursuant to U.N. Security Council Resolution
(UNSCR) 1244. This resolution called for "substantial
autonomy and meaningful self-administration" for the persons
of Kosova "within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia." UNMIK
and its chief administrator, the Special Representative of
the Secretary General (SRSG), established a civil
administration in 1999, following the conclusion of the NATO
military campaign that forced the withdrawal of Yugoslav and
Serbian forces from Kosova. Since that time, the SRSG and
UNMIK, with the assistance of the international community,
have worked with local leaders to build the institutions and
expertise necessary for self-government under UNSCR 1244.
UNSCR 1244 also formed an international peacekeeping force
in Kosova (KFOR) mandated to deter hostilities and establish
secure conditions.
The UNMIK-promulgated Constitutional Framework provides for
freedom of religion, as does UNMIK Regulation 1999/24 on
applicable law in Kosova; UNMIK and the provisional
institutions of self-government (PISG) generally respected
this right in practice. Respect for religious freedom
increased somewhat during the period covered by this report.
However, most of the tensions between Kosova's Albanians and
Serb populations were largely rooted in ethnic, rather than
religious, bias. Catholic institutions were not targets.
Attacks on Orthodox religious sites significantly decreased
after the March 2004 riots.
The U.S. Government discusses religious freedom issues with
UNMIK, the PISG, and religious representatives in Kosova as
part of its overall policy of promoting human rights. The
U.S. Government also supports UNMIK and KFOR in their
security and protection arrangements for churches and
patrimonial sites. In December 2004, the SRSG and KFOR
commander signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) which
specifies response mechanisms and cooperation between the
KPS and KFOR to maintain order. Contingency plans for riot
control have been revised, and now include operational
presence in municipalities and permanent contact among local
police, UNMIK, communities, village leaders and local
authorities.
In January 2005, under a new community policing initiative,
UNMIK police began phased deployment of 350 international
police officers to 30 locations in the region--sites for
potential return of a displaced Serb population and those
inhabited by Serbs.
Section I. Religious Demography
Kosova has an area of approximately 4,211 square miles and
its population is approximately 2 million. Islam is the
predominant faith, professed by most of the majority ethnic
Albanian population, the Bosniak, Gorani, and Turkish
communities, and some in the Roma/Ashkali/Egyptian
community, although religion is not a significant factor in
public life. Religious rhetoric is largely absent from
public discourse, mosque attendance is low, and public
displays of conservative Islamic dress and culture are
minimal. The Kosova Serb population, of whomapproximately
100,000 reside in Kosova and 225,000 in Serbia and
Montenegro, is largely Serbian Orthodox. Approximately 3
percent of ethnic Albanians are Roman Catholic. Protestants
make up less than one percent of the population and have
small populations in most of Kosova's cities. Approximately
40 persons from two families in Prizren have some Jewish
roots, but there are no synagogues or Jewish institutions.
Foreign clergy actively practice and proselytize. There are
Muslim, Orthodox, Catholic, and Protestant missionaries
active in Kosova. There are approximately 69 faith-based or
religious organizations registered with UNMIK which list
their goals as the provision of humanitarian assistance or
faith-based outreach.
Restrictions on Religious Freedom
During the period covered by this report, Kosova political
leaders--government and political party officials--have
increasingly called for tolerance. During the end of August
and the beginning of September 2004, then-Prime Minister
Bajram Rexhepi and SRSG Soren Jessen-Petersen visited
Serb-inhabited areas in the municipalities of Gjilan/Gnijlane,
Novoberde/Novo Brdo, Prizren, Mitrovice/Mitrovica, and Peje/Pec,
appealing to Kosova-Serbs to return. On February 27, 2005,
former Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj addressed a letter to
Kosova citizens calling upon them to respect the rule of law
and exercise tolerance, stating: "The Albanian majority has
a special obligation towards the Serb community. They should
be able to move freely in Kosova." During an April 2005
visit to Montenegro, Minister for Local Government
Administration along with Minister for Returns and
Communities Slavisha Petkovic, Minister of Local Government
Administration Lutfi Haziri, appealed to all of Kosova's
displaced to return home.
Forced Religious Conversion
There were no reports of forced religious conversion,
including of minor U.S. citizens who had been abducted or
illegally removed from the United States, or of the
government authorities' refusal to allow such citizens to be
returned to the United States.
Abuses by Terrorist Organizations
There were no reported abuses targeted at specific religions
by terrorist organizations during the period covered by this
report.
Kosova conflict is not a religious issue
Europe Report N°105
This report seeks to describe the current position of the
three major religious communities in Kosova. In part, it
aims to clarify misconceptions about the involvement of
religion in the Kosova conflict. It also proposes some areas
where religion might serve as a means to encourage
reconciliation among the peoples of Kosova.
Three religions – Islam, Orthodoxy, and Catholicism, have
long coexisted in Kosova. A large majority of Kosova
Albanians consider themselves, at least nominally, to be
Muslim. A minority, about 60,000, are Catholic. Most Kosova
Serbs, even those who are not active religious believers,
consider Orthodoxy to be an important component of their
national identity. Nevertheless, despite this essential
division of religious activities along ethnic lines, it
cannot be said that religion per se was an important
contributing factor in the conflict between Serbs and
Albanians.
Kosova Albanians do not define their national identity
through religion, but through language and have a relatively
relaxed approach towards the observance of the forms of the
Islamic religion. Neither Islamic leaders nor Islamic
theology played a significant role in either the eight-year
campaign of non-violent resistance to the Serb occupation
regime or the armed resistance of 1998-99. Islamic political
and social fundamentalism, as that term is understood with
respect to the Middle East, has very little resonance in
Kosova.
The image of Kosova Serbs and their monasteries, usually
portrayed as suffering harassment and persecution by the
Albanian majority population, formed a part of the
nationalist propaganda that Milosevic and his supporters
used to manipulate popular emotions. The Serbian Orthodox
Church, however, was always divided over Milosevic. It
initially supported him in large part to end what it saw as
the victimisation of the Serb nation under Communism and to
reverse the decline of the Serb presence in Kosova. But
Milosevic’s Communist career made the Church uneasy, as did
his use of violence. By the early 1990s, Patriarch Pavle was
publicly criticising Milosevic although some other members
of the Orthodox hierarchy continued to support him. After
the 1999 war, Bishop Artemije, the head of the Orthodox
Church in Kosova, assumed the leadership of those Serbs
willing to work with the International community there.
The Serbian and Albanian religious communities have been
more willing to talk to each other than other sectors of
Kosova society. As early as March 1999, before the NATO-led
intervention, representatives appointed by the leaders of
the three main religious communities in Kosova (Islamic,
Orthodox and Roman Catholic) held a joint meeting in
Pristina that was convened by the World Conference on
Religion and Peace (WCRP) to facilitate dialogue. The
representatives expressed opposition to the misuse of
religion for political reasons on all sides and called on
all parties not to use religious symbols to promote violence
or intolerance. They also expressed their determination to
maintain direct contacts between the religious communities
and to build channels of communication. An informal level of
dialogue has continued on a regular basis between some
members of the three main religious communities. These
interfaith meetings still contain some risks for the
participants, but they can be useful for facilitating a
better climate of tolerance and understanding between the
ethnic communities and might appropriately be the focus of
greater international community support. |
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